2018 Bench Memorandum by unknown
Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion 
Volume 9 
Issue 1 Thirtieth Annual Jeffrey G. Miller 
National Environmental Law Moot Court 
Competition 
Article 2 
November 2018 
2018 Bench Memorandum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law 
Commons, and the Water Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
2018 Bench Memorandum, 9 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. Online Companion 17 (2018) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review Online Companion by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
 
17 
THIRTIETH ANNUAL 
JEFFREY G. MILLER PACE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
MOOT COURT COMPETITION 
 
2018 Bench Memorandum* 
 
C.A. Nos. 17-000123 and 7-000124 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
 
ENERPROG, L.L.C., 
Petitioner, 
 
and 
 
FOSSIL CREEK WATCHERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
 
-v.- 
 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, 
Respondent, 
 
On Consolidated Petitions for Review of a Final Permit Issued 
Under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  This brief has been reprinted in its original format. Please note that the Table of 
Contents and Appendices have been omitted. 
 
1
  
18 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 9 
 
REGULATORY AND FACTUAL 
FRAMEWORK. 
 
A. PARTIES. 
 
EnerProg, L.L.C., operates the Moutard Electric Generating 
Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam electric power plant, located in 
Fossil, Progress. EnerProg was issued a renewed Clean Water Act 
(CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit for the continued operation of MEGS. EnerProg 
filed comments on the MEGS NPDES permit renewal. EnerProg 
petitioned the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) challenging 
the renewed NPDES permit. EnerProg’s petition for review was 
denied by the EAB. EnerProg appeals the EAB’s decision herein. 
 
Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc. (FCW), is an environmental 
group concerned with the environmental impacts of the Moutard 
Electric Generating Station. FCW filed comments on the MEGS 
NPDES permit renewal. FCW petitioned the EAB challenging the 
renewed NPDES permit, but the petition was denied. FCW appeals 
the EAB’s decision herein. The court has already determined that 
FCW has standing to pursue judicial review of the permit. 
 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
is the federal agency responsible for enforcing and administering 
select environmental laws and regulations. Its mission is to protect 
human health and the environment. MEGS is located in Fossil, 
Progress, within the jurisdiction of EPA Region XII. There is no 
state delegated NPDES program. Therefore, EPA Region XII 
issued the renewed NPDES permit for the continued operation of 
MEGS. EPA Region XII included conditions from the CWA Section 
401 Certification issued by the State of Progress in the final 
permit. The Region XII permit writer also relied on Best 
Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for requiring 
MEGS to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash wastes in 
order to achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants. The petitioners 
named the United States Environmental Protection Agency as the 
respondent in their petitions to review the final decision of the 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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Environmental Appeals Board. The respondent may be referred to 
as EPA or Region XII, herein. 
 
B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
 
This case is an appeal from a final decision of the 
Environmental Appeals Board affirming the re-issuance of a final 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit. The 
parties raise issues stemming from two legal authorities: 1) the 
Clean Water Act; and 2) the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
Clean Water Act issues, in short, are: 1) the inclusion of conditions 
as a part of the section 401 certification; 2) the permit writer’s 
reliance on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground 
for zero discharge requirements; and 3) whether a NPDES permit 
and a section 404 dredge and fill permit are required for the coal 
ash pond. The Administrative Procedure Act issues concern 
whether the suspension of two provisions were effective, as they 
pertain to requirements related to this NPDES permit. These 
claims will be discussed in greater detail in sections IV through 
VIII, below. 
The first major federal law addressing water pollution was the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, which became 
commonly known as the Clean Water Act after amendments made 
in 1977.1 The objective of the Clean Water Act “is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). In order to meet this 
objective, the Clean Water Act sets the goals of eliminating the 
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters and attaining a 
water quality that provides for waters to be both swimmable and 
fishable. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1), (2). 
To effectuate these goals, section 301 sets forth the basic 
prohibition of the Clean Water Act: “the discharge of any pollutant 
[into waters of the United States] by any person shall be unlawful” 
without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). See also 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1342(k), 1344(p); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a) (2017). Permits are issued 
under two permitting schemes: 1) section 402 National Pollutant 
 
1.  For more on the history of the Clean Water Act, see U.S. EPA, History of 
the Clean Water Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-
act (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
3
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits; and 2) section 
404 dredge and fill permits. 
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act established a permitting 
scheme that authorizes the discharge of pollutants into navigable 
waters from point sources, called the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. NPDES permits 
include effluent limitations applicable to the specific applicant and 
associated pollutant discharges, a compliance schedule, and 
monitoring and reporting requirements. Effluent limitations limit 
the amount or concentration of a particular pollutant that may be 
discharged. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44, 122.45. Effluent limitations 
are derived from water quality standards or technology-based 
standards. Water quality standards seek to achieve water quality 
that precisely meets the desired goals of a particular water body. 
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c); 40 C.F.R. § 131.2. These standards are 
adopted by states and approved by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(c)(2)(A). Technology-based standards are promulgated as 
effluent limitation guidelines (ELGs) on an “industry-by-industry” 
basis. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b). The EPA selects a particular technology 
on which to base a guideline, based on the category of pollutant or 
point source. Members of that industry need not use that specific 
technology, rather they must meet the standards achieved by the 
selected technology. Where a promulgated effluent limitation is 
lacking for an industry or sub-category of industry or for a specific 
pollutant, the permit writer may exercise Best Professional 
Judgment (BPJ) to determine an appropriate effluent limitation. 
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3). 
Section 404 sets forth a permitting scheme, administered by 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corp”), for 
activities that result in “the discharge of dredged or fill material 
into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(a). These permits may be denied upon a determination 
“that the discharge of such materials into such area will have an 
unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish 
beds and fisher areas . . . , wildlife or recreational areas.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(c). 
Applicants for permits under the Clean Water Act must also 
receive a certification from the state within which the discharge 
will originate: 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any 
activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation 
of facilities, which may results in any discharge into the navigable 
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a 
certification from the State. . . that any such discharge will comply 
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 
and 1317 of this title. 
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). The federal agency issuing the permit, 
generally, must either include the section 401 certification 
conditions or reject the issuance of the permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) 
(. . . shall become a condition on any Federal license of permit 
subject to the provisions of this section.”). Section 401(d) describes 
what can be included in the section 401 certification and is 
described further in section IV, infra. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs how 
administrative agencies can develop and issue regulations. 5 
U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The purpose of the APA is “[t]o improve the 
administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative 
procedure.” APA, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237, ch. 324 (June 11, 
1946). Relevant to this case, section 553 describes the basic process 
for notice and comment rulemaking, and when such process is 
applicable. 5 U.S.C. § 553. A more detailed description of this 
requirement is included in section V(C), infra. “The notice-and-
comment procedure assures that the public and the persons being 
regulated are given an opportunity to participate, provide 
information, and suggest alternatives so that the agency is 
educated about the impact of a proposed rule and can make a fair 
and mature decision.” Alexa L. Ashworth et al., 2 FED. PROC., L. 
ED. § 2:80 (2017). The APA also sets forth the standard of review 
that the Twelfth Circuit must apply when reviewing the decision 
of the EAB. 5 U.S.C. § 706. See section III, infra. 
 
1. List of Applicable Statutory and Regulatory 
Provisions: 
 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 – Congressional declaration of goals 
and policy 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 – effluent limitations 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 – state certification 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 – NPDES permits 
5
  
22 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 9 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 – dredge and fill permits 
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) – judicial review 
40 C.F.R. § 121.2 – state certification 
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3) – Best Professional Judgment 
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 – NPDES definitions 
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) - Army Corps definition of WOTUS 
40 C.F.R. § 124.19 – EAB review 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705 – relief pending judicial review 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 – rulemaking 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) – rulemaking definition 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 – standard of review 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) – statute of limitations for civil suits v. 
United States 
 
2. List of Agency Guidance Documents: 
 
U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY 
CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL FOR STATES 
AND TRIBES (2010). 
U.S. EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL § 5.2.3.2 (Sept. 
2010). 
 
C. SUMMARY OF FACTS. 
 
On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII issued a federal 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit to EnerProg, L.L.C., pursuant to section 402 of the Clean 
Water Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The permit authorizes 
EnerProg to continue water pollution discharges associated with 
the continued operation of the Moutard Electric Generating 
Station (MEGS), a coal-fired steam electric power plant located in 
Fossil, Progress. 
The underlying factual background for the permit renewal at 
issue is adequately stated in the following excerpts from the Fact 
Sheet for the permit:2 
 
2.  Although this factual summary contains all pertinent facts and procedure 
as developed by the opinion of the Environmental Appeals Board, it is condensed.  
Judges and brief graders should also review the Problem.  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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A. Summary and Background 
 
This is a renewal for the Moutard Electric Generating Station 
(MEGS). The facility is a coal-fired electric generating plant with 
one unit rated at a maximum dependable capacity of 745 
megawatts (MW). Water for plant uses is withdrawn from the 
Moutard Reservoir as required to make up for evaporative losses 
from the cooling tower, boiler water, ash transport water, and 
drinking water needs. This facility is subject to EPA effluent 
limitation guidelines per 40 C.F.R. section 423 - Steam Electric 
Power Generating Point Source Category. The facility has a closed-
cycle cooling system (cooling tower), with an actual intake flow and 
design intake flow of less than 125 million gallons per day (MGD). 
The facility has a wet fly ash handling system and a wet bottom 
ash handling system, which use water to sluice ash solids through 
pipes to one ash pond, where the transport water undergoes 
treatment by sedimentation before it is discharged to the Moutard 
Reservoir. The ash pond was created in June, 1978 by damming 
the then free-flowing upper reach of Fossil Creek. Fossil Creek 
does not discharge to the Moutard Reservoir, but is a perennial 
tributary to the Progress River, a navigable-in-fact interstate body 
of water. 
The facility operates the following outfalls: 
Outfall 001. Cooling Tower System. Less than once per year 
the cooling towers and circulating water system are drained by 
gravity and discharged directly to Moutard Reservoir. 
Outfall 002. Ash Pond Treatment System. Outfall 002 
discharges directly to Moutard Reservoir via a riser structure. The 
ash pond receives ash transport water containing bottom ash and 
fly ash, coal pile runoff, stormwater runoff, cooling tower 
blowdown, flue gas desulfurization (FGD) wastewater, and various 
low volume wastes such as boiler blowdown, oily waste treatment, 
wastes/backwash from the water treatment processes including 
Reverse-Osmosis (RO) wastewater, plant area wash down water, 
landfill leachate, monofill leachate, equipment heat exchanger 
 
This summary includes background information that was not included in the 
Problem, but is necessary for the teams to develop independently. These facts are 
indicated as such, see sections I(C)(3), (4) infra.   
7
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water, groundwater, yard sump overflows, occasional piping 
leakage from limestone slurry and the FGD system, and treated 
domestic wastewater. 
Internal Outfall 008. Fly ash and bottom ash transport water 
system, and cooling tower blowdown. Cooling tower blowdown is 
mixed with ash sluice water prior to discharging into the ash pond. 
These waste streams and ash transport water are directly 
discharged to the ash pond. Cooling tower blowdown is usually 
indirectly discharged to Moutard Reservoir via the ash pond 
treatment system (Outfall 002). Ash transport flows will be 
eliminated from this outfall upon completion of conversion to dry 
ash transport handling, whereby fly ash and bottom ash will be 
disposed of into a dry landfill. 
Internal Outfall 009. Discharge from the FGD blowdown 
treatment system to the ash pond. FGD blowdown is indirectly 
discharged to Moutard Reservoir via the ash pond treatment 
system (Outfall 002). 
Outfall 002A. Upon completion of construction, discharge from 
the new lined retention basin. The flows from the ash pond will be 
re-directed to the retention basin when the construction of the 
retention basin is completed. At that point, the ash pond will no 
longer accept any wastewater. Retention basin will accept wastes 
from the holding cell (vacuumed sediments and solids), monofill 
leachate (coal ash), coal pile runoff, stormwater runoff, cooling 
tower blowdown, FGD wastewater, and various low volume wastes 
such as boiler blowdown, oily waste treatment, wastes/backwash 
from the water treatment processes including Reverse-Osmosis 
(RO) wastewater, plant area wash down water, landfill leachate, 
equipment heat exchanger water, groundwater, occasional piping 
leakage from limestone slurry and FGD system, chemical metal 
cleaning waste, and treated domestic wastewater. The wastewater 
from this outfall discharges to Moutard Reservoir via Outfall 002. 
 
B. Permit Limits and Conditions Development 
 
The State of Progress has issued a certification pursuant to 
section 401 of the Clean Water Act for the renewal of the MEGS 
NPDES permit. One of the conditions of the Progress Section 401 
certification is that, in order to comply with the Progress Coal Ash 
Cleanup Act (CACA), EnerProg must cease operation of its ash 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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pond by November 1, 2018, complete dewatering of its ash pond by 
September 1, 2019, and cover the dewatered ash pond with an 
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. CACA is a state-enacted 
law requiring assessment, closure, and remediation of substandard 
coal ash disposal facilities in the State of Progress. The CACA 
legislation recites that its purpose is to prevent public hazards 
associated with the failures of ash treatment pond containment 
systems, as well as leaks from these treatment ponds into ground 
and surface waters. Pursuant to Clean Water Act section 401(d), 
these Progress requirements are incorporated as additional 
conditions to the permit. 
Pursuant to the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation Guidelines 
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 
40 C.F.R. part 423, Best Available Technology (BAT) for toxic 
discharges associated with bottom ash and fly ash is zero 
discharge, based on the available technology of dry handling of 
these wastes. Based on the requirements of the Progress 401 
certification, it is determined that MEGS is capable of meeting this 
zero discharge standard by the initial compliance deadline of 
November 1, 2018. The 2015 Steam Electric Power Generating 
Point Source Category ELGs are the subject of an industry 
challenge that is pending in the Fifth Circuit. See subsection 
I(C)(3), infra. The discharge from the MEGS coal ash pond contains 
elevated levels of mercury, arsenic, and selenium, which are all 
toxic pollutants. 
It is determined that, independent of the 2015 ELGs, this 
permit must contain limits for toxic pollutants actually present in 
the discharge based on the BAT. The EPA permit writer 
determined (as evident in the 2015 ELGs) that dry handling of 
bottom ash and fly ash has been in use at existing plants in the 
industry for many years. MEGS is sufficiently profitable to adopt 
dry handling of these wastes with zero liquid discharges, with no 
more than a twelve cents per month increase in the average 
consumer’s electric bill. Accordingly, the permit writer has 
determined, in the exercise of his best professional judgment, that 
zero discharge of ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018 
constitutes BAT for discharges associated with coal ash wastes. 
The facility will be required to build a new Retention Basin to 
reroute all waste streams that are currently discharged to the ash 
pond. This change is necessary to decommission the existing ash 
9
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pond and meet the requirements of CACA. The Retention Basin 
will have a cell where various vacuumed sediments and solids can 
be decanted prior to disposal. The Basin will also accept the 
monofill leachate. The monofill contains coal ash. 
The facility is also constructing a new FGD settling basin. The 
waste from the basin will be treated by VCE. In the case of severe 
storms, overflow from the basin may be routed to Outfall 002. 
Appropriate TBEL limits are applied to Outfall 002 to 
accommodate such overflows. 
The final permit contained the following conditions relevant to 
this appeal: 
 
I. By November 1, 2018 there shall be no discharge of 
pollutants in fly ash transport water. This requirement only 
applies to fly ash transport water generated after 
November 1, 2018. 
 
II. By November 1, 2018 there shall be no discharge of 
pollutants in bottom ash transport water. This requirement 
only applies to bottom ash transport water generated after 
November 1, 2018. 
 
Special Condition A: 
 
EnerProg must cease operation of its ash pond by November 
1, 2018, complete dewatering of its ash pond by September 
1, 2019, and cover the dewatered ash pond with an 
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. 
 
In addition, the final permit authorized the continued use of 
internal outfall 008 to transport bottom and fly ash to the coal ash 
pond without any effluent limits on an interim basis until closure 
of the coal ash treatment pond on November 1, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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C. 2015 ELG Suspension 
 
The following factual summary was not included in the Problem, 
but teams were expected to research and understand this 
background for the purposes of this case:3 
 
The EPA issued Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines (ELGs) 
in 2015 for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 
Category. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the 
Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 67838-01 (Nov. 3, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). These 
ELGs included zero-discharge requirements for coal ash transport 
water. Id. The effective date of the 2015 ELGs was January 4, 
2016; the compliance date is November 1, 2018. Id. at 67838, 
67882. In 2015, petitions were filed for review of the 2015 
regulations, which were consolidated in the Fifth Circuit in 
December, 2015. See Consolidation Order, In re: EPA, Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines, MCP No. 136, ECF Doc. 3 (J.P.M.L. Dec. 8, 
2015); Consolidation Order, Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15-
60821, ECF Doc. 00513301255 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2015). 
In March and April 2017, two petitions for administrative 
reconsideration were filed.4 On April 11, 2017, EPA Administrator 
Scott Pruitt sent a letter to Virginia Governor, and Chair of the 
National Governors’ Association, Terry McAuliffe notifying him of 
the flexibility provided to the state in the application of the new 
effluent limitations. Letter from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt 
to Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe (Apr. 11, 2017). On April 12, 
2017, Pruitt sent a letter to the March/April 2017 petitioners 
announcing the agency’s decision to: 1) postpone the November 1, 
2018 compliance deadlines; 2) reconsider the 2015 ELGs rule; 3) 
file a motion requesting the Fifth Circuit to hold the litigation 
challenging the Rule in abeyance during reconsideration; and 4) 
conduct notice and comment rulemaking. Id. The Notice cites 
section 705 of the APA as legal authority for this action. Letter 
from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to Petitioners Hunton & 
 
3.  See Appendix III for this factual background set forth in a timeline. 
4.  See U.S. EPA, Steam Electric Power Generating Effluent Guidelines – 
Petitions for Reconsideration, https://www.epa.gov/eg/steam-electric-power-
generating-effluent-guidelines-petitions-reconsideration (last visited Nov. 27, 
2017). 
11
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Williams, L.L.P., and U.S. Small Business Administration (Apr. 
12, 2017). See 5 U.S.C. § 705. 
On April 25, 2017, the notice given by letter to petitioners was 
detailed in the Federal Register (“the Notice”). Postponement of 
Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines and 
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source 
Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19005 (Apr. 25, 2017). The Notice reads: 
“. . . after considering the objections raised in the reconsideration 
petitions, the Administrator determined that it is appropriate and 
in the public interest to reconsider the Rule. Under Section 705 of 
the APA . . . , and when justice so requires, an Agency may 
postpose the effective date of action taken by it pending judicial 
review.” Id. at 19005. The Notice states that the November 1, 2018 
compliance dates have not yet passed and “are within the meaning 
of the term ‘effective date’ as that term is used in Section 705 of the 
APA.” Id. The Notice cites the capital expenditures required by 
facilities in order to meet the new standards. Id. The Notice also 
states: “This will preserve the regulatory status quo with respect 
to wastestreams subject to the Rule’s new, and more stringent, 
limitations and standards, while the litigation is pending and the 
reconsideration is underway.” Id. 
On April 14, 2017, prior to the Notice, the EPA requested that 
the Fifth Circuit hold the consolidated case in abeyance while the 
Agency reconsiders the Rule.  On April 24, 2017, the Fifth Circuit 
granted the motion and placed the case in abeyance. On June 6, 
2017, the EPA published notice of the proposed rule to postpone 
deadlines. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for the 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 
26017-01 (June 6, 2017). The EPA explained: “Because Section 705 
of the APA authorizes an Agency to postpone the effective date of 
an action pending judicial review, EPA is undertaking this notice-
and-comment rulemaking to postpone certain compliance dates in 
the rule in the event that the litigation ends.” Id. at 26018. On 
August 11, 2017, the EPA sent a letter to the petitioners stating 
their intention to conduct rulemaking to revise the ELGs. Letter 
from EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt to Petitioners Hunton & 
Williams, L.L.P., and U.S. Small Business Administration (Aug. 
11, 2017). 
 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/2
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There has been development on this issue following the 
September 1, 2017 cut-off date established for the purposes of this 
competition. Teams have been instructed to not cite any decisions or 
documents dated after September 1, 2017 in briefs or in oral 
argument. 
 
D. WOTUS Exception Suspension 
 
The following factual summary was not included in the 
Problem, but teams were expected to research and understand this 
background for the purposes of this case:5 
 
40 C.F.R. section 122.2 defines “waters of the United States” 
to include “all impoundments of waters otherwise identified as 
waters of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Subsection 2 of this 
definition specifically excludes “waste treatment systems, 
including ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of 
the Clean Water Act.” Id. However, there is an exception to this 
exclusion: “This exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water 
which neither were originally created in waters of the United 
States (such as disposal area in wetlands) nor resulted from the 
impoundment of waters of the United States.” Id. (emphasis added). 
To further complicate this back-and-forth, Note 1 to this 
section explains: “At 45 FR 48620, July 21, 1980, the 
Environmental Protection Agency suspended until further notice 
in § 122.2, the last sentence beginning ‘This exclusion applies ___’ 
in the definition of ‘Waters of the United States.’ Th[e 1983] 
revision continues that suspension.” Id. n.1. See Consolidated 
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48620-01 (July 21, 1980). The 
suspension was in response to petitions for review from industry 
groups and one environmental group. 45 Fed. Reg. at 48620. 
Industry objections included concerns “that the language of the 
regulation would require them to obtain permits for discharges 
into existing waste treatment systems . . . which had been in 
existence for many years. In many cases, [industry groups] argued, 
EPA has issued permits for discharges from, not into, these 
systems.” Id. The EPA suspended this exception after determining 
“that the regulation should be carefully re-examined and that it 
 
5.  See Appendix IV for this factual background set forth in a graphic. 
13
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may be overly broad.” Id. The EPA cited their intention to 
“promptly . . . develop a revised definition and to publish it as a 
proposed rule for public comment. At the conclusion of that 
rulemaking, EPA will amend the rule or terminate the 
suspension.” Id. (emphasis added). 
In sum, as a result of this suspension (of the exception to the 
exclusion), waste treatment systems, including ponds or lagoons 
designed to meet the requirements of the CWA, including those 
that resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United States 
do not fall under the definition of waters of the United States. 
Despite the EPA’s stated intent, rulemaking was never conducted 
– and the suspension remained in place. 
However, the 2015 Clean Water Rule “[l]ift[ed] the suspension 
of the last sentence of the definition.”6 Clean Water Rule: 
Definition of “Waters of the United States”; Final Rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 37054, 37114 (June 29, 2015). The Rule then asserts to, again, 
“suspend[] the last sentence of the definition,” id., likely as a 
measure to properly employ notice and comment rulemaking for 
this suspension. In effect, the 2015 Clean Water Rule retains the 
suspension. Of course, the 2015 Clean Water Rule was stayed by 
the Sixth Circuit, thus the 1983 revisions currently apply.7 In re 
EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  This sentence is the suspension made in 45 Fed. Reg. 48620 (July 21, 
1980), discussed above. 
7.  On February 28, 2017, President Trump, by executive order, ordered the 
review of the 2015 Clean Water Rule, in light of a declaration of policy that reads: 
“It is in the national interest that the Nation’s navigable waters are kept free from 
pollution, while at the same time promoting economic growth, minimizing 
regulatory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and 
the States under the Constitution.” Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 
(Feb. 28, 2017). On July 27, 2017, EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers 
published a proposed rule to rescind the 2015 Clean Water Rule and recodify the 
prior regulations. Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of 
Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34899 (July 27, 2017). The agencies would then 
re-evaluate the definition. Id. Public comment for the proposed rule closed on 
September 27, 2017, after an extension. Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules; Extension of Comment Period, 82 
Fed. Reg. 39712 (Aug. 22, 2017). 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On April 1, 2017, after being granted an extension by the 
Environmental Appeals Board, both EnerProg and Fossil Creek 
Watchers, Inc. (FCW), filed timely petitions for review in front of 
the EAB of the NPDES permit pursuant to 40 C.F.R. part 124, 
requesting on a number of grounds that the permit be remanded 
to Region XII for further consideration. Both parties filed 
supplement briefing on the issue of the April 25, 2017 Notice 
suspending the compliance date of the 2015 ELGs. EnerProg and 
FCW both properly preserved their respective claims by filing 
comments on the draft permit. 
EnerProg challenged the inclusion in the final permit of a 
condition in the Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification issued 
by the State of Progress requiring EnerProg to terminate its use of 
the coal ash settling pond at MEGS by November 1, 2018, dewater 
the ash pond by September 1, 2019, and cap the remaining coal 
combustion residuals by September 1, 2020. EnerProg challenged 
the inclusion of the zero discharge requirements for coal ash 
transport waters from the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation 
Guidelines (ELGs) for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point 
Source Category, despite the Notice issued by EPA Administrator 
Scott Pruitt on April 25, 2017 suspending the compliance date for 
these ELGs. EnerProg also challenged the permit writer’s reliance 
on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for 
requiring MEGS to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash 
wastes in order to achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants 
associated with these wastes by November 1, 2018. 
FCW challenged the ash pond closure and capping provisions, 
on the grounds that these requirements are unlawful unless a 
section 404 permit is obtained. In addition, FCW contended that 
the permit illegally authorizes discharges of bottom ash and fly ash 
pollutants into the coal ash pond without subjecting the discharges 
to CWA effluent limitations, because the MEGS ash pond itself is 
a water of the United States. 
During the Spring Term, 2017, the EAB issued their decision 
to deny both petitions for review. The EAB rejected EnerProg’s 
objections to the inclusion of the ash pond closure and capping 
conditions because they are sufficiently related to surface water 
quality and, therefore, fall within the scope of section 401(d). The 
15
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EAB found the EPA’s reliance on BPJ as an alternative ground for 
the zero discharge requirement for ash transport and treatment 
wastes to be justified because the 1982 ELGs did not regulate the 
toxic pollutants within these wastes, rejecting EnerProg’s claim. 
The EAB denied EnerProg’s claim that the inclusion of the 2015 
ELG compliance deadlines was inappropriate given the April 25, 
2017 Notice of their suspension, therefore also denying the party’s 
request for modification. EAB found that this suspension was 
ineffective because section 705 of the APA does not authorize the 
postponement of compliance dates, therefore notice and comment 
rulemaking was required for such a suspension. 
The EAB also rejected both of FCW’s claims. The EAB found 
that the suspension of a provision that included the coal ash pond 
as a water of the United States was effective, and therefore Outfall 
008 into the coal ash pond was internal. Therefore, this discharge 
does not require a section 402 permit. The EAB also found that a 
section 404 permit is not required for the closure and capping of 
the coal ash pond. 
EnerProg and FCW both filed timely petitions pursuant to 
section 509(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b),8 
seeking judicial review of the final decision of the EAB, affirming 
the issuance of the Final NPDES Permit to EnerProg. 
The Court has determined that both petitioners have standing 
to pursue their petitions for review, that jurisdiction properly lies 
in this court pursuant to 33 U.S.C. section 1369(b), and that all 
issues raised in the petitions were properly preserved for appeal. 
  
 
8.  “Review of the Administrator’s action . . . may be had by any interested 
person in the Circuit Court of Appeals.” 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).  
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ISSUES 
 
I. Whether the Final Permit properly included conditions 
requiring closure and remediation of the coal ash pond as 
provided by the State of Progress in the CWA section 401 
certification, including the questions:  
a. Whether EPA was required to include all such 
Progress certification conditions without regard to 
their consistency with CWA section 401(d); and  
b. Assuming the question of the consistency of the 
conditions with CWA section 401(d) is open to the 
EPA and to this reviewing court, whether the ash 
pond closure and remediation conditions constitute 
“appropriate requirements of State law” as required 
by CWA section 401(d). 
 
On appeal, EnerProg will argue that EPA must review the 
permissibility of the conditions and the closure conditions are not 
appropriate. 
On appeal, EPA will argue that it does have jurisdiction to 
consider the permissibility of conditions, but that these conditions 
are appropriate. 
On appeal, FCW will argue that EPA has no jurisdiction to 
determine the appropriateness of the conditions of State CWA 
section 401 certifications, and that while these conditions are 
“appropriate requirements of State law,” they independently 
violate the requirement for a CWA section 404 permit. 
 
II. Whether the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice suspending certain 
future compliance deadlines for the 2015 Final Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power 
Generating Industry is effective to require the suspension 
of the permit compliance deadlines for achieving zero 
discharge of coal ash transport water. 
 
On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the April 25, 
2017 Notice is effective to require suspension of the compliance 
deadlines, and their inclusion in the NPDES permit was improper. 
17
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 On appeal, FCW will argue that the April 25, 2017 Notice is 
ineffective in requiring suspension of the compliance deadlines, 
and their inclusion in the NPDES permit was proper. 
 
III. Whether EPA Region XII could rely on Best Professional 
Judgment as an alternative ground to require zero 
discharge of coal ash transport wastes, independent of the 
applicability or effectiveness of the 2015 Steam Electric 
Power Generating Industry Effluent Limitation Guidelines. 
 
On appeal, EnerProg will argue that EPA could not rely on 
Best Professional Judgment. 
On appeal, EPA and FCW will argue that the agency could 
rely on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground for 
requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes. 
 
IV. Whether NPDES permitting requirements apply to 
EnerProg’s pollutant discharges into the MEGS ash pond, 
in light of EPA’s July 21, 1980 suspension of the provision 
of 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 that originally included waste 
treatment systems formed by impounding pre-existing 
waters of the United States within the regulatory definition 
of waters of the United States. 
 
On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the discharges 
into the ash pond are not subject to effluent limits because this 
suspension was effective. 
On appeal, FCW will argue that the discharges into the ash 
pond are subject to effluent limits because this suspension was 
ineffective and the other requirements are met. 
 
V. Whether the ash pond closure and capping plan requires a 
permit for the discharge of fill material pursuant to section 
404 of the CWA. 
 
On appeal, EnerProg and EPA will argue that it does not. 
On appeal, FCW will argue that it does. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Administrative exhaustion requires that the final NPDES 
permit first be reviewed by the Environmental Appeals Board. 40 
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2); 5 U.S.C. § 704. Petitions must be filed within 
thirty days after the issuance of the final NPDES permit,9 and 
“[a]ny person who filed comments on the draft permit . . . may file 
a petition for review.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)(2), (3). The final 
decision of the EAB is reviewable by the appropriate Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). Petitions for judicial review 
must be filed within 120 days of the final agency action challenged. 
Id. 
In this proceeding, the Twelfth Circuit is reviewing the EAB’s 
denial of petitions to review a final NPDES permit. Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, a federal court will review the 
EAB’s decision to determine whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). See City of Pittsfield, Mass. v. U.S. EPA, 614 
F.3d 7, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2010). With regard to how the court should 
treat the EAB’s interpretation: “To the extent that the EAB’s 
decision reflects a gloss on its interpretation of the governing EPA 
regulations, a reviewing court must also afford those policy 
judgments substantial deference, deferring to them unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise ‘plainly’ impermissible.” 
Pepperell Assocs. v. U.S. EPA, 246 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2001). The 
court’s review of the agency’s interpretation of the statute that 
Congress has entrusted it to administer must be guided by 
Chevron deference. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984) (holding that where the statute is either “silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute”). “[A] reviewing court must generally 
be at its most deferential” when the agency is “making predictions, 
within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of 
science.”  Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 
(1983). But see P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 
1993) (“But in the end an agency decision must also be rational – 
technically speaking, it must not be ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ . . . 
 
9.  The EAB granted both parties an extension of this 30-day deadline. 
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and that requirement exists even in technical areas of 
regulation.”). 
The Supreme Court set forth a four-part test to determine if a 
decision was arbitrary or capricious: “[I]f the agency has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 
ARGUMENTS 
 
I. SECTION 401 CERTIFICATION: Did the Final 
Permit properly include conditions requiring closure 
and remediation of the coal ash pond as provided by 
the State of Progress in the section 401 certification? 
 
In front of the Environmental Appeals Board, EnerProg 
argued that the inclusion of the ash pond closure and capping 
conditions10 as permit requirements was in violation of section 
401(d) of the Clean Water Act because the conditions are not 
“appropriate requirements of State law.” EnerProg argued that 
these CACA conditions are not based on achieving State water 
quality standards, nor are they related to achieving effluent 
limitations. EnerProg also argued that the EAB has the authority 
to review these conditions because there is no procedure available 
under the Laws of Progress for it to obtain judicial review of the 
conditions included in the section 401 certification. The EAB 
rejected both arguments. 
EnerProg and EPA can make a strong argument that the EAB 
had the authority to review the section 401 certification conditions 
because no available channels for state review are available. EPA 
and FCW will be able to make a persuasive argument that the EAB 
was not arbitrary or capricious in determining that the section 401 
 
10.  Note: In conjunction with the closure and capping of the coal ash pond, 
this waste stream will subsequently be subject to dry ash transport handling, 
whereby fly ash and bottom ash will be disposed of into a dry landfill. R. at 8. 
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conditions were “appropriate requirements of state law” under a 
commonly accepted broad reading of this phrase. EnerProg will 
have to rely on a strict reading of the phrase. 
 
II. REVIEWING AUTHORITY: Was the EPA required to 
include all such Progress certification conditions? 
 
Generally, the conditions included in a section 401 state 
certification are not reviewable by federal courts or administrative 
proceedings. The NPDES implementing regulations read: “Review 
and appeals of limitations and conditions attributable to State 
certification shall be made through the applicable procedures of 
the State and may not be made through the procedures in this 
part.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (emphasis added). 
While this issue has never been decided by the Supreme Court, 
circuit courts have consistently held that in order to challenge 
conditions included in a section 401 certification, the “only recourse 
is to challenge the state certification in state judicial proceedings.” 
Del Ackels v. U.S. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 1993). See also 
Am. Rivers Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. U.S. EPA, 684 F.2d 
1041, 1056 (1st Cir. 1982). The First Circuit further reasoned that 
the authority to review these conditions is limited “because a state 
law determination is involved.” Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d at 
102. 
In American Rivers, the Second Circuit looked to the language 
of section 401(d) which reads, “[a]ny certification provided under 
this section . . . shall become a condition on any Federal license or 
permit subject to the provisions of this section.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) 
(emphasis added); Am. Rivers, Inc., 129 F.3d at 107. The court 
found the “language [of section 401(d) to be] unequivocal, leaving 
little room for [the federal agency] to argue that it has authority to 
reject state conditions it finds to be ultra vires.” Am. Rivers, Inc., 
129 F.3d at 107. Rather, “[w]hile the [federal agency] may 
determine whether the proper state has issued the certification or 
whether a state has issued a certification within the prescribed 
period, the [federal agency] does not possess a roving mandate to 
decide that substantive aspects of state-imposed conditions are 
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inconsistent with the terms of § 401.” Id. at 110-11. This is the 
reasoning followed in the EAB decision. R. at 11. 
Agency guidance documents also reflect this interpretation. In 
the 2010 Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification 
Handbook, the EPA distinguishes the scope of review of state 
versus federal courts or administrative proceedings, where federal 
courts or agencies solely have the authority to review procedural 
requirements. U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER 
QUALITY CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL 
FOR STATES AND TRIBES 31 (2010) [hereinafter CWA SECTION 401 
HANDBOOK].  See also EPA, Decision of the General Counsel No. 
58 (Mar. 29, 1977). 
EnerProg and EPA will rely on the special circumstances 
rule established by the Fourth Circuit that allows for federal 
judicial or administrative review. In Consolidation Coal Company, 
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, the court found that the 
permit recipient had “no available channels of State review, either 
administratively or judicially.” 537 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1976). 
Therefore, “due process requires that” the permittee be granted an 
administrative proceeding in front of the EPA. Id. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. Here, as EnerProg argued in front of the EAB, a fact 
uncontested by FCW, “there is no procedure available under the 
Laws of Progress for it to obtain judicial review of its challenge to 
the conditions established in the Progress CWA section 401 
certification, as Progress law does not provide for review of such 
certifications in the state’s courts.” R. at 10-11. Therefore, the only 
available avenue is a federal administrative or judicial proceeding. 
These parties will conclude that the EAB “entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, by not considering the lack of a state channel 
for review, and therefore their determination was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
FCW will argue that the Fourth Circuit decision in 
Consolidation Coal is not binding on the Twelfth Circuit, and that 
the prevailing view is that the EPA is not authorized to review the 
section 401 certification conditions. FCW will also note that the 
Seventh Circuit specifically declined to follow the reasoning of 
Consolidation Coal. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 836 
(7th Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds by W. Chi., Ill. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
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EnerProg and EPA might also choose to make the due 
process argument from scratch, rather than rely on Consolidation 
Coal. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. FCW would respond that, 
regardless, the proper remedy to ensure due process is to review 
the section 401 conditions in state court or administrative 
proceeding, not before the EPA or the Twelfth Circuit. 
 
III. APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS: Were the ash 
pond closure and remediation conditions 
“appropriate requirement[s] of State law” as 
required by CWA section 401(d)? 
 
Section 401(d) allows for certification conditions to include 
conditions “to assure that any applicant for a Federal . . . permit 
will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other 
limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, . . . and with 
any other appropriate requirement of State law.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(d). See also 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4) (State certification shall 
include, “[a] statement of any conditions which the certifying 
agency deems necessary or desirable with respect to the discharge 
of the activity.”). The EAB found that the ash pond remediation 
was sufficiently related to surface water quality as to fall within 
the scope of section 401(d), relying on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). See R. at 11. 
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County,11 the Supreme Court 
adopted a broad reading of section 401(d). 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
First, the Court held that section 401 state certification conditions 
do not need to be related to the specific discharges for which the 
permit is sought, rather “401(d) is most reasonably read as 
authorizing additional conditions and limitations on the activity as 
a whole once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, 
is satisfied.” Id. at 711. Second, the Court held that conditions 
“imposed pursuant to state water quality standards” are 
 
11.  In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, the section 401 certification condition 
at issue was the requirement of maintaining minimum stream flow in order to 
support spawning salmon. 511 U.S. at 714-15. This condition was held to be 
appropriate as “a proper application of state and federal antidegradation 
regulations, as it ensures that an ‘existing instream water us[e]’ will be 
‘maintained and protected.’” Id. at 719. 
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appropriate requirements of state law, but refused to speculate as 
to what other conditions would satisfy this standard. Id. at 713. 
The Court further noted that water quality standards “consist of 
the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water 
quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” Id. at 714 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)) (emphasis in original). 
EnerProg will argue that the ash pond closure and capping 
conditions are not related to water quality standards, and are 
therefore inappropriate section 401 certification conditions. CACA 
does not refer to any specific standards that could be considered 
“water quality standards.” Similar to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, the Clean Water Act Section 401 
Water Quality Certification Handbook explains that “[w]ater 
quality standards consist of designated uses, criteria (narrative 
and numeric), and an antidegradation policy, which together 
provide environmental benchmarks for each class of water body.” 
U.S. EPA, CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 401 WATER QUALITY 
CERTIFICATION: A WATER QUALITY PROTECTION TOOL FOR STATES 
AND TRIBES 19 (2010). The party will argue that the conditions are 
not sufficiently linked to water quality standards, or that the State 
of Progress has not clearly articulated their relation to these 
standards, such that their inclusion as conditions was arbitrary 
and capricious. 
FCW and EPA will advocate for a broader reading of section 
401(d). A broad reading is supported by the implementing 
regulation for section 401 which states that the certification may 
include any condition “desirable” with respect to the activity. 40 
C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4). See also Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 379 F. Supp. 243, 249 (N.D. 
N.Y. 1974) (“[T]he Congressional intent is clear that the states 
retain the right to set more restrictive standards than those 
imposed by the Act.”). Several courts have taken expansive 
readings of what conditions are permitted, including those related 
to water quality generally. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. U.S. 
Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that a state 
“mixed” land use and environmental regulation was an 
appropriate basis for a section 401 condition); Arnold Irrigation 
Dist. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 717 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986) (concluding that section 401(d) permits all conditions 
necessary to meet “all water quality-related statutes and rules,” 
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including land use regulations). See also Debra L. Donahue, The 
Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
201,  254 (1996) (“[W]hile the limits of the term “any other 
appropriate requirement of State law” have yet to be defined, a 
broad interpretation, not confined to state water quality standards 
approved by EPA per CWA section 303, seems justified.”). The 
Clean Water Act Section 401 Water Quality Certification Handbook 
also explains: “Under CWA § 401(d) the water quality concerns to 
consider, and the range of potential conditions available to address 
those concerns, extends to any provision of state or tribal law 
relating to the aquatic resource. Considerations can be quite broad 
so long as they relate to water quality.” CWA SECTION 401 
HANDBOOK at 23 (emphasis added). Therefore, even where there 
are no water quality standards to apply, or if they were not 
considered, so long as the condition relates to water quality, it is 
appropriate under section 401(d). 
Here, the section 401 conditions stemmed from the Progress 
Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA), a law whose purpose is “to prevent 
public hazards associated with the failures of ash treatment pond 
containment systems, as well as leaks from these treatment ponds 
into ground and surface waters.” R. at 8-9. The law is directly 
related to preserving water quality. Furthermore, the capping and 
closure conditions can also be considered to directly relate to the 
purpose of the Clean Water Act in that they aim to prevent the 
discharge of pollutants from the closed ash pond (pollutants that 
might otherwise be subject to section 301 and 402 if discharged 
from the pond). Furthermore, these conditions are standard 
requirements for the closure of coal ash ponds. See, e.g., Hazardous 
and Solid Waste Management System; Disposal of Coal 
Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities; Final Rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 21302 (Apr. 17, 2015). 
EnerProg might note the underlying reasoning for urging the 
court to not include the ash pond closure requirements as 
conditions on the NPDES permit. If these conditions are included, 
EnerProg’s compliance, or lack thereof, is subject to the citizen suit 
provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. If these requirements 
remain solely under the purview of CACA, the citizen suit 
provision does not apply; rather the Progress agency would be 
solely responsible for ensuring compliance. 
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FCW might also note here that the section 401 ash pond 
closure conditions, while appropriate requirements of state law, 
independently violate the requirement for a CWA section 404 
permit. See section VIII, infra. 
 
IV. ELG COMPLIANCE DATE: Did the April 25, 2017 
EPA Notice effectively suspend permit compliance 
deadlines for achieving zero discharge of coal ash 
transport water? 
 
In front of the EAB, EnerProg requested an extension of the 
compliance deadline for the zero discharge requirement for coal 
ash transport waters from the 2015 Final ELGs for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, consistent with 
the Notice issued by EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt on April 25, 
2017 suspending the compliance date for these ELGs. The EAB 
found that EnerProg had not demonstrated that the November 1, 
2018 deadline in the permit was infeasible. Furthermore, the EAB 
found that section 705 of the APA only authorizes the suspension 
of effective dates, not compliance dates, as the one at issue here. 
Instead, the EAB concluded that the EPA must conduct notice and 
comment rulemaking in order to suspend the compliance date. 
EnerProg and EPA will argue on appeal that the EAB’s 
refusal to extend the compliance date, despite its suspension by the 
EPA, was arbitrary and capricious because the use of section 705 to 
suspend the compliance date was proper, adequately justified, and, 
regardless, notice and comment rulemaking was not required for 
the suspension as it was not substantive rulemaking. FCW has the 
stronger argument here. The EAB’s denial of EnerProg’s claim was 
not arbitrary or capricious because the section 705 suspension was 
not proper, nor was it justified, and notice and comment 
rulemaking was required for such a suspension. 
EnerProg and EPA might first argue that 40 C.F.R. section 
122.62 authorizes the modification of an existing permit when: 
 
[t]he standards or regulations on which the permit was based have been 
changed by promulgation of amended standards or regulations . . . after 
the permit was issued. Permits may be modified during their terms for 
this cause only as follows: 
(i) For promulgation of amended standards or regulations, when: 
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(A) The permit condition requested to be modified was based on a 
promulgated effluent limitation guideline . . . ; and 
(B) EPA has revised, withdrawn, or modified that portion of the 
regulation or effluent limitation guideline on which the permit condition 
was based . . . ; and 
(C) A permittee requests modification in accordance with § 124.5 
within ninety (90) days after Federal Register notice of the action on 
which the request is based. 
 
40 C.F.R. § 122.62(a)(3). Here, relying on a successful argument 
that the 2015 ELGs were properly revised, according to the parties’ 
arguments outlined below, EnerProg and EPA would argue that 
EnerProg properly requested modification through the EAB 
petition. FCW would argue that, for the reasons outlined below, a 
proper basis for the permit modification cannot be established 
because the revision to the 2015 ELGs was improper. FCW would 
also argue that EnerProg did not follow the proper procedure in 
requesting this permit modification. 40 C.F.R. section 124.5 
requires that a request for modification must be submitted to the 
Region XII Administrator and “shall be in writing and shall 
contain facts or reasons supporting the request.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.5(a). Instead, EnerProg sought a modification through the 
EAB proceeding already in progress. 
 
V. INVOCATION OF SECTION 705: Was the invocation 
of section 705 to suspend the compliance date proper? 
 
EnerProg and EPA will argue that this suspension was an 
effective invocation of section 705 of the APA, and that notice and 
comment rulemaking was not required prior to issuing the Notice. 
As the Notice states, the compliance date is “within the meaning 
of the term ‘effective date’ as that term is used in Section 705 of the 
APA.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. The term effective date is not defined 
in this chapter. 5 U.S.C. ch. 7. See 5 U.S.C. § 701. The parties might 
argue that the agency should be granted Chevron deference with 
regards to this interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
EnerProg and EPA might also argue that considering the 
purpose of section 705, to maintain the status quo while pending 
litigation is resolved, the court must find a broad reading of section 
705 that includes compliance dates. Since the compliance date is 
the “date with teeth,” it is this date that must be the subject of 
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section 705. However, the Northern District of California rejected 
this argument, finding in a case with similar facts that, “. . . the 
Rule began to require compliance when it went into effect . . . . 
Thus, rather than being toothless as of the effective date and only 
suddenly acquiring a set of teeth as of the . . . compliance date, in 
actuality the Rule imposed compliance obligations starting on its 
effective date . . . that increased over time.” Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, No. 17-cv-02376-EDL, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017). 
FCW will argue, in response, that section 705 of the APA does 
not apply to compliance dates. The plain language of the statute 
only refers to the postponement of “effective date[s].” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 705. The Supreme Court has stated that courts should 
“ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do 
not appear on its face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 
(1997). See also Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 
1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 1993). The court should not read into section 
705 the inclusion of compliance dates within its scope, despite the 
arguments from EnerProg. Furthermore, since the language of 
section 705 is unambiguous as to what can be postponed, the EPA’s 
interpretation should not be granted Chevron deference. Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843. 
Contrary to EnerProg’s argument that the meaning of 
“compliance date” is within the meaning of the term “effective 
date,” as the Notice itself claimed, these two terms have distinct 
meanings. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9 (citing Silverman v. 
Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“The mandatory compliance date should not be misconstrued as 
the effective date of the revisions.”); NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 683 F.2d 
752, 762 (3d Cir. 1982)). Section 705 “permits an agency to 
postpone the effective date of a not yet effective rule, pending 
judicial review.” Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, No. 92-1629, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 2324, at *2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). The existence 
of both an effective date and a compliance date in the rule itself 
seems to defy EnerProg and EPA’s argument. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 
67838, 67854. 
 EnerProg and EPA might also argue that possible timing 
constraints require a broader reading of the language in section 
705. For example, the parties may argue that an agency will not be 
able to invoke section 705 after a lawsuit is filed, yet before the 
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effective date. This argument was raised in front of the district 
court in Becerra, but was met unsympathetically given the clear 
language of the statute. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8. If these 
parties raise this argument, FCW will cite to the specific timing of 
this case. Here, litigation was first filed in 2015, with the cases 
consolidated on December 8, 2015. The effective date of the 2015 
ELGs is January 4, 2016. The Notice of the section 705 suspension 
was not published until April 25, 2017, only after the transition of 
administrations and the filing of petitions for administrative 
reconsideration. This timeline shows that tight timing was likely 
not at issue here, and therefore should not be considered as a basis 
for an expanded reading of section 705. 
 
VI. SECTION 705 JUSTIFICATION: Was the section 705 
notice adequately justified (arbitrary and 
capricious)? 
 
FCW should also argue that the April 25, 2017 Notice was 
ineffective because it did not meet the additional statutory 
requirements of section 705 that it be based on “pending litigation” 
and that “justice so requires” postponement. In the Notice, EPA 
found that justice requires the postponement “[i]n light of the 
capital expenditures that facilities incurring costs under the Rule 
will need to undertake in order to meet the compliance deadlines 
for the new, more stringent limitations and standards in the 
Rule . . . [and] the far-ranging issues contained in the 
reconsideration petitions.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. No other 
justification is included. 
 
A. Four-Part Preliminary Injunction Test. 
 
FCW may argue that EPA did not meet the four-part 
preliminary injunction test in issuing the postponement under 
section 705, as is required given that administrative stays must 
meet the same standard as stays at the judicial level. See Sierra 
Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30-31 (D. D.C. 2012); Affinity 
Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Sebelius, 720 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15 n.4 (D. 
D.C. 2010); Corning Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
Bd., 562 F. Supp. 279, 280 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Jeffrey v. Office of Pers. 
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Mgmt., 28 M.S.P.R. 434, 435-36 (M.S.P.B. 1985). The standard is 
as follows: 
 
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be 
irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be 
harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in 
granting the stay. 
 
Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). See also Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 
113 (8th Cir. 1981); Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. 
v. Seilig Mfg.Co., Inc., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1977).  Courts 
have applied these factors to evaluate administrative stays issued 
under section 705. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm’n, 812 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1987); Hamlin Testing 
Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 337 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 
1964); Associated Sec. Corp. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 283 F.2d 773 
(10th Cir. 1960). 
The EPA failed to apply the four-part preliminary injunction 
test in order to establish that “justice so requires.” FCW need not 
make the argument that these four-factors are not met, since EPA 
entirely failed to mention or employ the test. 
FCW might also note the long-standing practice of the EPA 
employing this four-part test. The EAB has applied the test to a 
request for a stay under section 705, In the Matter of Pub. Serv. Co. 
of N.H., 1 E.A.D. 389 (EAB 1977), and the EPA has evaluated the 
four factors in considering petitions for administrative stays under 
the same statute. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 28318 (May 17, 2011); 76 
Fed. Reg. 4780 (Jan. 26, 2011); 75 Fed. Reg. 49556 (Aug. 13, 2010); 
61 Fed. Reg. 28508 (June 5, 1996). If the EPA wished to depart 
from this precedent it would need to provide justification, for “[l]ike 
a court, ‘[n]ormally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in 
adjudicating cases before it.’” Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Consol. 
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC., 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). The EPA did not provide any justification for departing from 
its precedent of employing this test. 
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B. “Pending Judicial Review” 
 
FCW will argue that EPA’s invocation of section 705 was 
further improper in that, in effect, it did not postpone the 
compliance date “pending judicial review.” The Notice indicated 
the agency’s intention to stay the litigation, rather than await its 
resolution: “EPA will also file a motion requesting the Fifth Circuit 
to hold the litigation challenging the Rule in abeyance while the 
Agency reconsiders the Rule, after which it will inform the Court 
of any portions of the Rule for which it seeks a remand so that it 
can conduct further rulemaking.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005-06. This 
statement itself is misleading, given that EPA moved to stay the 
litigation on April 14 and the motion was granted on April 24 – 
both prior to the issuance of the Notice. The purpose of section 705 
is to allow pending disputes be resolved by the courts before a rule 
is put into effect. By holding the cases in abeyance, the EPA 
undermined the entire purpose of the suspension. See Becerra, 
2017 WL 3891678, at *9. The true purpose of the April 25, 2017 
Notice was not, in fact, to suspend the compliance date “pending 
judicial review,” but perhaps it was used as a stopgap measure 
until the reconsideration of the rule is complete. 
 
C. Failure to Consider Important Aspect of the 
Problem 
 
FCW will also argue that the EPA “entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 
U.S. at 43. The only statement made in the April 25, 2017 Notice 
that indicated the EPA’s justification was in reference to the costs 
imposed upon industry to meet the new standards. The EPA did 
not appear to weigh the benefits of the 2015 ELGs, which would be 
foregone given the postponement of the compliance deadline. FCW 
may also argue that other important aspects were not discussed in 
the Notice. 
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VII. NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: Was 
notice and comment rulemaking required? 
 
EnerProg and EPA will argue that notice and comment 
rulemaking was not required. First, these parties might argue that 
section 705 effectively stands in for the notice and comment 
rulemaking requirement, therefore rulemaking is not required 
where section 705 is invoked. Section 705 does not include any 
cross reference to section 553(d) of the APA. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) 
(includes cross references to sections 556 and 557); 5 U.S.C. 
§ 556(a) (includes cross references to sections 553 and 554). 
However, FCW will note, this argument was found to be 
unpersuasive in Becerra by the Northern District of California. 
Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *10. The D.C. Circuit has held that 
section 705 “does not permit the agency to suspend without notice 
and comment a promulgated rule.” Safety-Kleen Corp., 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 2324, at *2-3. Second, EnerProg and EPA might 
argue that requiring notice and comment rulemaking could 
undermine the purpose of section 705 because of the time 
necessary to complete the process, during which litigation would 
resume. FCW would respond by noting the other mechanisms to 
temporarily suspend litigation, such as a motion for abeyance, 
which could be employed during the notice and comment 
rulemaking process. 
Generally, rulemaking includes the amendment or repeal of a 
rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (“‘Rule making’ means agency process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”).  In other words, 
rulemaking is required for a “substantive” rule, but not for: “(A) . . . 
interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when the agency 
for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon 
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The Supreme Court noted that the term 
“‘substantive rule’ is not defined in the APA,” Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979), but the Court has determined 
that a substantive rule is “one ‘affecting individual rights and 
obligations.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 
(1974)). See also N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power 
Partners, L.P., 267 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sweet v. 
Sheehan, 235 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (substantive rules “are 
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those that ‘create new law, right, or duties, in what amounts to a 
legislative act’”). 
EnerProg and EPA will argue that even if section 705 does 
not override section 553, the rulemaking requirement does not 
apply here because the suspension of the compliance date was not 
substantive. To prove this point, the parties may analogize this 
case to Sierra Club v. Jackson, in which the EPA issued a Delay 
Notice staying the effective date of two rules regulating emission 
standards under the Clean Air Act, relying on section 705 as its 
authority. 833 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D. D.C. 2012). The court held that 
“the Delay Notice does not constitute substantive rulemaking . . . 
and therefore is not subject to notice and comment requirements,” 
but ultimately found that the notice was arbitrary and capricious. 
Id. at 29, 34. The court found: 
 
[T]he Delay Notice simply preserves the status quo. A temporary stay to 
preserve the status quo does not constitute a substantive rulemaking 
because, by definition, it is not “designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy.” . . . Such a stay is not designed to do anything other 
than preserve the status quo. 
 
Id. at 28 (quoting 5 U.S.C § 551(4) (citations omitted)). 
Similarly, EnerProg and EPA will argue that the suspension 
of the compliance date is to preserve the status quo. The Notice 
stated: “This will preserve the regulatory status quo with respect 
to wastestreams subject to the Rule’s new, and more stringent, 
limitations and standards, while the litigation is pending and the 
reconsideration is underway.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. The 
suspension was not substantive, as it simply retained the status 
quo of the regulatory scheme prior to the 2015 ELGs, while the 
ongoing litigation or the new notice and comment rulemaking were 
concluded. As an indication of the temporary nature of this 
suspension, EPA subsequently published a proposed rule 
suspending the compliance dates until full reconsideration of the 
rule is complete. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for 
the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed Reg. 
26017 (June 6, 2017). This suspension by rulemaking, and 
intention to continue with further reconsideration, signals that the 
EPA intended to use the section 705 suspension solely to maintain 
the status quo until such actions were taken, and not as an 
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indefinite measure that would constitute substantive rulemaking. 
No substantive changes to the requirements of the rule, beyond a 
mere postponement of compliance, were made. 
FCW will respond by differentiating Sierra Club v. Jackson 
from our case, in that Sierra Club involved the suspension of an 
effective date, not a compliance date. See Becerra, 2017 WL 
3891678, at *11. The difference in the effect of suspending a 
compliance date is significant. The 2015 ELGs had already gone 
into effect and industry groups had begun to invest in 
infrastructure so as to meet the upcoming compliance deadlines. 
See Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8. The D.C. Circuit held that 
the deferral of a compliance deadline for mine safety regulations 
was “in effect an amendment to a mandatory safety standard.” 
Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 579 n.26 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). “[B]y deferring the requirement that coal 
operators supply life-saving equipment to miners, it had ‘palpable 
effects’ upon the regulated industry and the public in general.’” Id. 
at 580 n.28 (quoting Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Fed. Energy Admin., 569 
F.2d 1137, 1146 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977). Similarly, here, the 
effect of suspending the compliance deadline is substantive in that 
it affects the obligations of regulated industries and the rights of 
the public whom the promulgated rule considered. Furthermore, 
Sierra Club v. Jackson is not binding on the Twelfth Circuit. 
FCW may further argue that the suspension does not preserve 
the status quo. As the Northern District of California found in 
Becerra: 
 
[The agency’s] suspension of the Rule did not merely “maintain the status 
quo,” but instead prematurely restored a prior regulatory regime. . . . 
Defendants’ interpretation would allow the agency broad latitude to delay 
implementation long after a rule was formally noticed to the public as 
taking effect by characterizing other later dates as compliance dates and 
thereby retroactively abrogating the published effective date. 
 
Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *9. The suspension of a deadline for 
the purposes of reevaluating the policy is not a matter of 
preserving the status quo. In a dissenting opinion for the D.C. 
Circuit, Judge Edwards explains: “Certainly a decision to suspend 
indefinitely regulations that are the product of exhaustive study 
and comprehensive rulemaking, in order to allow a wholesale 
reevaluation of a major regulatory program, cannot be viewed as a 
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temporary measure for preserving the status quo.” Public Citizen 
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 671 F.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (Edwards, J., dissenting). See also Public Citizen v. Steed, 
733 F.2d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (a suspension that “will remain in 
effect indefinitely unless and until the agency completes a full 
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding to reinstate the . . . 
program [is ‘a paradigm of a revocation’]”). “The value of notice and 
comment prior to repeal of a final rule is that it ensures that an 
agency will not undo all that it accomplished through its 
rulemaking without giving all parties an opportunity to comment 
on the wisdom of repeal.” Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. 
FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
The Third Circuit also addressed the issue in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency. 683 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1982). The court found that the 
indefinite postponement of the effective date required rulemaking, 
otherwise “it would mean that an agency could guide a future rule 
through the rulemaking process, promulgate a final rule, and then 
effectively repeal it, simply by indefinitely postponing its operative 
date.”12 Id. at 762. See also Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 
713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983); NRDC v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 
179, 194 (2d Cir. 2004). A rule “without an effective date . . . would 
be a nullity because it would never require compliance.” NRDC, 
683 F.2d at 762. Similarly, an indefinite postponement of a 
compliance date would also nullify a rule – therefore, rulemaking 
is required. 
Finally, FCW might note that any subsequent rulemaking 
does not cure the error of invoking section 705 or failing to 
undertake notice and comment rulemaking prior to the suspension 
of the compliance date. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *11. 
 
 
 
12.  “By postponing the effective date of the amendments, EPA reversed its 
course of action up to the postponement. That reversal itself constitutes a danger 
signal. Where the reversal was accomplished without notice and an opportunity 
for comment, and without any statement by EPA on the impact of that 
postponement on the statutory scheme pursuant to which the amendments had 
been promulgated, the reviewing court must scrutinize that action all the more 
closely to insure that the APA was not violated.” NRDC, 683 F.2d at 760-61.  
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VIII. RULEMAKING EXCEPTION: Do any exceptions to 
the requirement for rulemaking apply? 
 
Notice and comment is required for rulemaking, or the “agency 
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(5). The notice and comment rulemaking requirement does 
not apply: 
 
(A) to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or 
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest. 
 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b). 
All parties should agree that the EPA did not seek to invoke 
the good cause exception to the requirement for notice and 
comment rulemaking when the agency suspended the compliance 
date in the April 25, 2017 Notice. In order to invoke the good cause 
exception, the agency must make a determination that the 
procedure is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest,” and must “include this finding and a short statement of 
reasons with the new regulations.” Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 
F.2d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1982); 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The requirement 
for express invocation is strict, as “the good cause exception is 
essentially an emergency procedure.” Buschmann, 676 F.2d at 357. 
See also United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“The Agency must overcome a high bar if it seeks to invoke 
the good cause exception to bypass the notice and comment 
requirement.”); Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Devine, 671 F.2d 607, 610 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 
(1979). If the agency has not included such a finding, the court 
“may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.” N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. United Farm 
Workers, 702 F.3d 755, 767 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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The EPA did not expressly invoke the good cause exception to 
the requirement for notice and comment rulemaking. EnerProg 
will note that EPA did cite the mounting “capital expenditures that 
facilities incurring costs under the Rule will undertake in order to 
meet the new, more stringent limitations and standards in the 
Rule, . . . [therefore] justice requires it to postpone the compliance 
dates.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 19005. However, this was unlikely an 
attempt to invoke the good cause exception, and if it were, it was 
not sufficient. No other exceptions to the requirement are 
applicable. 
 
IX. RELIANCE ON BEST PROFESSIONAL 
JUDGEMENT: Can EPA Region XII rely on BPJ as an 
alternative ground to require zero discharge of coal 
ash transport wastes? 
 
Before the EAB, EnerProg challenged the permit writer’s 
reliance on Best Professional Judgment as an alternative ground 
(if the 2015 ELGs were properly suspended) for requiring MEGS 
to implement dry handling of bottom and fly ash wastes in order to 
achieve zero discharge of toxic pollutants associated with these 
wastes by November 1, 2018. The EAB responded to this issue, 
despite the fact that “this [BPJ] requirement does not currently 
have any practical effect on the permit requirements.” R. at 11. The 
EAB found that the reliance on BPJ was justified because 40 
C.F.R. section 125.3(c)(3) specifically provides for the use of BPJ 
for pollutants not covered by the ELGs for an industry category: 
“[w]here promulgated effluent limitation guidelines only apply to 
certain aspects of a discharger’s operation, or to certain pollutants, 
other aspects or activities are subject to regulation on a case-by-
case basis.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(3). It is undisputed that the 
effluent from the MEGS coal ash pond contains toxic pollutants 
such as mercury, arsenic, and selenium, that are not regulated by 
the 1982 ELGs. R. at 11. See Steam Electric Power Generating 
Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 
Pretreatment Standards and New Source Performance Standards, 
47 Fed. Reg. 52290, 52303 (Nov. 19, 1982). 
On appeal, EnerProg has a strong argument that the EAB’s 
determination that the reliance on BPJ was justified was arbitrary 
and capricious because the toxic pollutants were “considered” by the 
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EPA in the 1982 ELGs, and the pollutants at issue were properly 
covered by the 2015 ELGs at the time this NPDES permit was 
issued. FCW and EPA will argue that the EAB decision was not 
arbitrary and capricious because the toxic pollutants, while 
considered in the 1982 ELGs, can now be properly treated by 
technology that has since developed. 
Generally, NPDES permits include: 
 
all applicable ELGs promulgated by the EPA for the pertinent category or 
subcategory. . . . In situations where the EPA has not yet promulgated any 
ELGs for the point source category or subcategory, NPDES permits must 
incorporate “such conditions as the Administrator determines are 
necessary to carry out the provisions of [the CWA].” 
 
Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 928-29 (5th Cir. 
1998) (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(a)(1)). “[I]n the true absence of an applicable Guideline, 
permitters are obliged to engage in BPJ analysis in order to satisfy 
the Act’s requirement of appropriate technology-based effluent 
limits.” Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Ky. Waterways Alliance, 
517 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Ky. 2017). Thus, the permit writer will 
exercise her best professional judgment to fill in these gaps in such 
a way that will meet the goals of the statute.13 NPDES regulations 
provide guidance on how these determinations should be made: 
(c)(2) On a case-by-case basis under section 402(a)(1) of the 
Act, to the extent that EPA-promulgated effluent limitations are 
inapplicable. The permit writer shall apply the appropriate factors 
listed in § 125.3(d) and shall consider: (i) The appropriate 
technology for the category or class of point sources of which the 
applicant is a member, based upon all available information; and 
(ii) Any unique factors relating to the applicant. . . . (d) In setting 
case-by-case limitations pursuant to § 125.3(c), the permit writer 
must consider the following factors . . . (3) For BAT requirements: 
(i) The age of equipment and facilities involved; (ii) The process 
 
13.  “In the absence of national standards, the Act authorizes the 
Administrator to issue permits on ‘such conditions as the Administrator 
determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act].’ However, in 
issuing permits on a case-by-case basis using its ‘Best Professional Judgment,’ 
EPA does not have unlimited discretion in establishing permit effluent 
limitations.” NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1988) (insertion in 
original) (citation omitted). 
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employed; (iii) The engineering aspects of the application of various 
types of control techniques; (iv) Process changes; (v) The cost of 
achieving such effluent reduction; and (vi) Non-water quality 
environmental impact (including energy requirements). 
40 C.F.R. § 125.3. In their analysis, the permit writer 
considered that dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash has been in 
use at existing plants in the industry for many years. R. at 9. The 
permit writer also noted that MEGS is sufficiently profitable to 
adopt dry handling of these wastes with zero liquid discharges, 
with no more than a twelve cents per month increase in the 
average consumer’s electric bill. Id. EnerProg might argue that 
the EPA did not consider all the required factors listed in 40 C.F.R. 
section 125.3(d) based on their absence from the record. Therefore, 
the permit writer improperly employed BPJ. 
EPA and FCW will note, as the EAB also determined, that if 
the compliance date for the 2015 ELGs is properly suspended, the 
current applicable guidelines are the 1982 ELGs for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category. See Daniel H. 
Conrad, Filling the Gap: The Retroactive Effect of Vacating Agency 
Regulations, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). The parties will 
argue that the provision for employing BPJ does not just apply to 
the broader category of point sources, but also to specific 
pollutants.  The most recent NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual 
explains: 
 
When effluent guidelines are available for the industry category, but no 
effluent guidelines requirements are available for the pollutant of 
concern . . . . The permit writer should make sure that the pollutant of 
concern is not already controlled by the effluent guidelines and was not 
considered by EPA when the Agency developed the effluent guidelines. 
 
U.S. EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL § 5.2.3.2 at 5-45-5-
46 (Sept. 2010). See also Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 
488 (“In the case . . . where an existing ELG applies to some part 
or aspect of the applicant’s discharge, but the existing ELG leaves 
other parts or aspects of the discharge unaddressed, then the 
permit writer applies the Guideline to the extent possible, and 
employs the BPJ analysis to the extent necessary, to arrive at 
appropriate technology-based effluent limits.”). Therefore, even 
though the MEGS point source category is covered by the 1982 
ELGs, toxic pollutants in bottom and fly ash wastes are not 
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regulated by the 1982 ELGs – a fact that is undisputed by the 
parties. R. at 11. 
However, EPA and FCW must also establish that these 
pollutants were not “considered” by the EPA when the 1982 ELGs 
were developed. The EPA explained, in the 1982 ELGs, that these 
pollutants, among others, were “excluded from national regulation 
because they are present in amounts too small to be effectively 
reduced by technologies known to the Administrator.” Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category; Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and New Source 
Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52290, 52303 (Nov. 19, 1982). 
Courts have found that an agency’s determination that current 
technology cannot meaningfully reduce the amount of a pollutant 
serves as “consideration.” Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d 
at 488-89; NRDC v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 414 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2015). EPA and FCW might try to overcome this by noting 
that the available technology has changed since the issuance of the 
1982 ELGs, therefore it is appropriate that the permit writer 
consider the current available technology – and it should be noted 
that EnerProg has not established that compliance with a zero-
discharge standard for these pollutants was not feasible. R. at 11. 
But see Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 490 (suggesting 
that the appropriate remedy would be to bring suit against the 
EPA for failing to comply with its mandatory duty to timely review 
ELGs). 
EnerProg will further argue that at the time the permit was 
finalized (January 18, 2017), the 2015 ELGs were still in place and 
covered the toxic pollutants in bottom and fly ash wastes. The 
NPDES regulations only authorize the permit writer to employ 
best professional judgment when “EPA-promulgated effluent 
limitations are inapplicable.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2). The 
regulations do not authorize the permit writer to use BPJ to 
establish standards in the case where those standards already 
existed. 
EnerProg might also argue that given anticipated 
reconsideration of the rule, it was not appropriate for the permit 
writer to rely on BPJ and establish an alternate ground for zero 
discharge of these pollutants. Given that, upon the finalization of 
this permit, several cases challenging the 2015 ELGs had already 
been filed and the transition of administrations was imminent, 
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EnerProg might reasonably argue that this regulatory scheme (the 
2015 ELGs) were due to be reconsidered. This argument requires 
an extension of an argument found in Louisville Gas and Electric 
Company, where the court explained that “a permitter may defer 
the BPJ exercise so as to avoid issuing a permit not in keeping with 
national standards.” 571 S.W.3d at 491. See also NRDC v. U.S. 
EPA, 863 F.2d 1420, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1988). The court found that 
it was reasonable for the permitter to refrain from exercising BPJ 
where the “EPA [was] apparently poised to issue a new national 
Guidelines.”14 Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 571 S.W.3d at 491. Thus, 
a permit writer is permitted to not exercise BPJ, but the 
permissive language implies that the permit writer would not be 
abusing her discretion if she did exercise BPJ regardless of 
impending rulemaking. This argument relies on a degree of 
speculation as to what was forthcoming, given that no rulemaking 
had been initiated. The argument also would result in the freezing 
of the authority of an agency upon an impending transition of 
administrations, by limiting the exercise of judgment by permit 
writers. 
 
X. NPDES PERMIT: Is a NPDES permit required for the 
pollutant discharges into the ash pond? 
 
Before the EAB, FCW asserted that the discharges from 
outfall 008 to the coal ash pond15 should not be considered internal 
discharges, but rather should be treated as a direct discharge to 
the waters of the United States that requires implementation of 
effluent limits under CWA sections 301(b) and 402. FCW argued 
that the July 21, 1980 suspension should not be given effect 
because it lacked statutory authorization and failed to comply with 
the requirements of section 553 of the APA. 
 
14.  The facts of Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Kentucky Waterways 
Alliance run parallel to this case, yet the decision made by the permit writer 
diverges from the EPA here. 517 S.W.3d 479 (Ky. 2017). In Louisville Gas, the 
permit writer did not exercise BPJ, citing pending rulemaking. Here, EnerProg 
would be arguing that the EPA should not have exercised BPJ because of pending 
rulemaking.  
15.  The coal ash pond was impounded from Fossil Creek, a perennial 
tributary to the Progress River, a navigable-in-fact interstate body of water, for 
the purposes of waste treatment. R. at 7. 
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The EAB declined to disturb the longstanding policy judgment 
of successive EPA administrations. The July 21, 1980 suspension 
of this language has been in effect for over 35 years, having been 
reincorporated in two subsequent reconsiderations of section 
122.2. Therefore, no effluent limitations are required for internal 
outfall 008, as it does not discharge into a water of the United 
States as that term is defined in the regulations. FCW appeals this 
determination. 
On appeal, FCW will argue that the EAB was arbitrary and 
capricious in failing to consider that the suspension of the exception 
was ineffective given that notice and comment rulemaking was 
required. Therefore, the coal ash pond is a water of the United 
States, and a NPDES permit is required for the internal outfall 008. 
EnerProg and EPA will argue that the EAB was not arbitrary or 
capricious in their determination, and that the statute of 
limitations for challenging the 1980 suspension has since passed, 
as well as this being the inappropriate venue or remedy. 
FCW will argue that the suspension of the exception that 
would bring the ash pond back within the definition of “waters of 
the United States” required notice and comment rulemaking. See 
section V(C), supra, for the legal authorities describing the notice 
and comment rulemaking requirement for substantive 
rulemaking. In sum, as the Supreme Court held in Chrysler 
Corporation v. Brown, a substantive rule is “one ‘affecting 
individual rights and obligations.’” 441 U.S. at 302 (quoting 
Morton, 415 U.S. at 232). FCW will argue that the suspension 
effectively terminates certain obligations regarding CWA 
requirements by removing a category of a body of water from the 
jurisdiction of the statute. The definition of “waters of the United 
States” lies at the heart of the CWA, underlying the two core 
permitting schemes (section 402 NPDES permits and section 404 
dredge and fill permits). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1344. Any 
amendment to this definition alters the obligations of a potential 
permittee and qualifies as a substantive rulemaking. As seen here, 
it dictates whether or not a permit is required for a discharge. 
Therefore, the suspension of this exception was not effective. With 
no such suspension, the ash pond falls outside the jurisdiction of 
section 301, and no permit is required for the discharge of 
pollutants into it. 
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FCW might also note the purpose of the exemption exception 
included in the notice of its promulgation: “Because [the] CWA was 
not intended to license dischargers to freely use waters of the 
United States as waste treatment systems, the definition makes 
clear that treatment systems created in those waters or from their 
impoundment remain waters of the United States.” Consolidated 
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 33298 (May 19, 1980). The 
suspension, however, removes these waste treatment 
impoundments from the definition of WOTUS. This suspension is 
not merely interpretational; rather, again, it affects rights and 
obligations. EnerProg and EPA might cite to West Virginia Coal 
Association v. Reilly, in which the district court agreed with the 
EPA’s argument that the exception was “not definitional, rather it 
was merely explanatory in nature,” therefore the “definitional 
mandate” was unaffected by the suspension. 728 F. Supp. 1276, 
1290 (S.D. W.V. 1989). 
Similar to the application in section V(D), supra, the good 
cause exception to rulemaking was not properly invoked by the 
EPA in making the suspension. While the EPA supplied a brief 
statement of its reasoning for suspending the exception, it does not 
relate this statement to the good cause exception or to an inability 
to employ notice and comment rulemaking. Even if this were an 
invocation of the good cause exception, the EPA would have since 
been required to conduct notice and comment rulemaking. In 
American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Block, 
the D.C. Circuit held that “once an emergency situation has been 
eased by the promulgation of interim rules, it is crucial that the 
comprehensive permanent regulations which follow emerge as a 
result of the congressionally-mandated policy of affording public 
participation that is embodied in section 553.” 655 F.2d 1153, 1158 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
After FCW establishes that the suspension was ineffective, 
and that the ash pond is a water of the United States subject to 
section 301, the party must also establish that the other elements 
of section 402 are met, such that a NPDES permit is required for 
internal outfall 008 which discharges into the ash pond. A section 
402 NPDES permit is required for any discharge of pollutants into 
waters of the United States from a point source. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(a) (“Except in compliance with this section and section[] . . . 
1342 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall 
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be unlawful.”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (“Discharge of a pollutant means: 
(a) Any addition of any ‘pollutant’ or combination of pollutants to 
‘waters of the United States’ from any ‘point source’ . . . . Point 
source means any discernible, confined, and discrete 
conveyance . . . .” Also, defining “waters of the United States” as 
described herein.). Fly ash and bottom ash wastes, containing toxic 
pollutants, are discharged from MEGS via internal outfall 008, a 
discrete conveyance, into the coal ash pond. R. at 8. This discharge 
clearly meets the other elements of the section 402 permit 
requirement. 
EnerProg and EPA might cite support for the EAB’s 
deferential treatment of the EPA’s longstanding policy judgment. 
See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“We 
consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts 
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.”); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. 
Ct. 2517 (2013) (longstanding agency views entitled to deference); 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (2011) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50 (“The 
length of time the agencies have held them suggests that they 
reflect careful consideration, not ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n].’”). 
EnerProg and EPA will argue that even if notice and 
comment rulemaking was required, the statute of limitations for 
challenging the ineffective suspension has long passed. 28 U.S.C. 
section 2401(a) establishes the statute of limitations for civil suits 
brought against the United States: “[E]very civil action commenced 
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint it 
filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2401(a). This statute of limitations applies to claims 
brought under the APA. Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 
1315 (9th Cir. 1988). 
An APA claim against the EPA for failure to employ notice and 
comment rulemaking for the 1980 suspension first accrued upon 
the date of notice of the suspension (July 21, 1980). Consolidated 
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48620 (July 21, 1980). In Herr v. 
U.S. Forest Service, the Sixth Circuit explains: 
A classic example would be an agency that issues a rule 
without following all requirements of notice-and-comment 
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rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). This denial of process to the 
public at large violates the statute, and any party concretely 
injured by the action (say, a party who has to pay a fee because of 
the rule) may sue to correct that wrong. The clock for the injured 
party begins to tick the moment the agency took its final action 
because the agency’s lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking 
already legally injured the party. 803 F.3d 809, 820 (6th Cir. 2015). 
Furthermore, “[a]ctual knowledge of government action . . . is not 
required for a statutory period to commence.” Shiny Rock Min. 
Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Because the six-year statute of limitations has since long-passed, 
FCW can no longer challenge the 1980 suspension. A challenge of 
the NDPES permit is also not the appropriate venue for this 
challenge against the EPA’s 1980 suspension. 
FCW may respond by stating that it can still bring a timely 
as-applied challenge, despite the fact that the suspension was 
issued in 1980. The agency action was not “final” for the purposes 
of judicial review until the issuance of the NPDES permit here. 
The Supreme Court has identified four factors for determining 
when agency action is final: (1) whether the challenged action is a 
definitive statement of the agency’s position, (2) whether the action 
has the status of law with penalties for noncompliance, (3) whether 
the impact on the plaintiff is direct and immediate, and (4) whether 
the agency expects immediate compliance. Dunn-McCampbell 
Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Parl Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1288 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 
U.S. 136, 149-53 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)). The Fifth Circuit has held “that when 
an agency applies a rule, the limitations period running from the 
rule’s publication will not bar a claimant from challenging the 
agency’s statutory authority. . . . [Many Circuit Court decisions] 
stand for the proposition that an agency’s application of a rule to a 
party creates a new, six-year cause of action to challenge to the 
agency’s constitutional or statutory authority.” Dunn-McCampbell 
Royalty Interest, Inc., 112 F.3d at 1287. See Wind River Mining 
Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991); Public 
Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 901 F.2d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); Texas v. United States, 749 F.2d 1144, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985). 
The issuance of the NPDES permit served as the final agency 
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action relevant to FCW, restarting the statute of limitations six-
year clock; therefore FCW can still challenge the 1980 suspension. 
 
XI. SECTION 404 PERMIT: Does the ash pond closure 
and capping require a permit for the discharge of fill 
material pursuant to section 404? 
 
Before the EAB, FCW claimed that even if the section 122.2 
exclusion from the definition of “waters of the United States” 
applies for the purpose of a section 402 permit for the discharge of 
pollutants, once the coal ash pond is closed, it no longer qualifies 
as a waste treatment system. Therefore, both the abandonment of 
the remaining coal ash and the placement of an impermeable cap 
constitute the discharge of fill material requiring a permit under 
CWA section 404. The EAB held that the exclusion does not contain 
any recapture provision that would convert the ash pond back into 
waters of the United States upon its retirement. Since the 
discharges to the ash pond do not require a section 402 permit, and 
since the jurisdictional definition of the waters of the United States 
is the same for section 402 and 404 permitting, the EAB reasoned, 
no section 404 permit is required for the ash pond closure and 
capping activities. 
On appeal, FCW will argue, as above, that the 1980 suspension 
was not valid, therefore a section 404 permit is required. EnerProg 
and EPA have the stronger argument here. These parties will argue 
that the correct definition (for the Army Corps) clearly states that 
the coal ash pond is not a water of the United States, and the 
definition does not include a recapture provision. 
FCW might first argue, relying on their arguments detailed in 
the section above, that the suspension of the exception to the 
exclusion of 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 was never valid. Therefore, the 
ash pond is a water of the United States, subject to the requirement 
for a 404 permit.  Section 404 of the Clean Water Act describes the 
permitting scheme for “the discharge of dredged or fill material 
into the navigable waters at specific disposal sites” administered 
by the Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. FCW argues, 
as it did before the EAB, that the closure and capping of the coal 
ash pond requires a section 404 permit, as these actions constitute 
the discharge of fill material. The regulatory definition of “fill” as: 
“material placed in waters of the United States where the material 
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has the effect of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United 
States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any 
portion of a water of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) 
(2017). The capping of the ash pond will both replace the coal ash 
pond, which was impounded from Fossil Creek, with dry land, and 
will change the bottom elevation. Therefore, the closure of the coal 
ash pond requires a section 404 permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344. 
EnerProg and EPA will respond that regardless of whether 
the suspension in 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 is valid, the relevant 
definition for the purposes of section 404 permit requirements is 
the Army Corps definition found at 33 C.F.R. section 328.3, 
contrary to the holding of the EAB. 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 only 
applies to the 402 permitting program. Here, the history is much 
simpler. In this definition, “waters of the United States” do not 
include “[w]aste treatment systems, including ponds or lagoons 
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” 33 
C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1). There is no exclusion or exception listed. By 
the plain language of the regulation, the ash pond is not a “water 
of the United States,” and not subject to the section 404 permit 
requirement. 
The EAB held that 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 exception does not 
include a recapture provision. EnerProg and EPA will note that 
the same can be said for the Army Corps definition (33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3). The language of both 40 C.F.R. section 122.2 and 33 
C.F.R. section 328.3(b)(1) do not indicate that the exclusions are 
temporary, whilst the waste treatment purpose is in effect. The 
Supreme Court has stated that courts should “ordinarily resist 
reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its 
face.” Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). See also 
Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 
1993). The Proposed Rule explicitly stated, in reference to the 
exclusion of waste treatment systems, among other exclusions: 
“There is no recapture provision for these excluded waters in the 
proposal.” Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the 
Clean Water Act; Proposed Rule. 79 Fed. Reg. 22187, 22189 (Apr. 
21, 2014). This holds true for the final rule. 
A comment on the proposed rule urged the agencies to include 
a recapture provision for the excluded waters, indicating that “the 
permanency of these exclusions [was unsupported] with science.” 
U.S. EPA, Clean Water Rule Comment Compendium, Topic 7: 
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Features and Waters Not Jurisdictional 47 (June 2015).16 The EPA 
responded: “The agencies believe the exclusions contained in the 
final rule provide a balance between protection and clarity that is 
reasonable and consistent with the statute’s goals and objectives.” 
Id. at 23. Furthermore, Congress chose to include a recapture 
provision for a separate category of waters, therefore its absence 
for the category at issue is more significant. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344(f)(2). 
FCW might make a policy argument to support their 
contention that the ash pond should revert into a water of the 
United States upon termination of its use for waste treatment. The 
party may argue that the definitional exclusion clearly states the 
purpose of these ponds as serving as waste treatment systems to 
meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed in teams’ 
written submissions and oral arguments. One should appreciate 
reasoned and reasonable creativity and ideas beyond those in this 
limited analysis. 
  
 
16.  Available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
06/documents/cwr_response_to_comments_7_njd.pdf.   
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SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
 
These questions are suggested as a starting point. Please feel 
free to develop your own. 
 
Issue 1: Did the Final Permit properly include conditions 
requiring closure and remediation of the coal ash pond as 
provided by the State of Progress in the section 401 
certification? 
 
Issue 1(a): Does the EPA or federal court have the authority 
to review section 401 state certification conditions? 
 
EnerProg and EPA 
 
1. Under section 401 and its implementing regulations, who 
has jurisdiction to review section 401 conditions? 
2. Why should this court ignore this jurisdictional grant 
[requiring review of section 401 certification conditions to 
be in state courts]? 
3. Even if due process requires a judicial or administrative 
avenue for review of these conditions, why should review be 
in federal courts or administrative proceedings, rather than 
the appropriate remedy be in state courts? 
 
FCW 
 
1. What is the EPA’s proper remedy when it does not approve 
of certification conditions? 
2. Given that there are no available channels of state review 
in Progress, why should the section 401 certification 
conditions not be reviewable by federal judicial or 
administrative means? [Why shouldn’t this court following 
the reasoning in Consolidation Coal?] 
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Issue 1(b): Were the section 401 state certification 
conditions appropriate? 
 
EnerProg 
 
1. How should this court define “appropriate requirements of 
State law?” What are the bounds of “water quality 
standards” as they pertain to section 401 conditions? 
2. Why does the capping and closure requirement fall outside 
of these bounds? 
3. Does a narrow definition of “water quality standards” 
properly serve the purpose of the CWA and section 401 
conditions? 
4. If these requirements will still apply to the coal ash pond, 
under CACA, why is it important that they also not be 
included in Progress’ section 401 certification? 
 
FCW and EPA 
 
1. What are the bounds of “appropriate requirements” or 
“water quality standards” such that conditions included in 
section 401 certifications are appropriately limited? How 
should this court define these terms in order to rationally 
and reasonably limit their scope? 
2. How do the closure and capping conditions relate to water 
quality standards? 
3. How do state section 401 conditions, and corresponding 
state review, comport with the authority of the CWA over 
the issuance of NPDES permits? 
 
Issue 2: Did the April 25, 2017 EPA Notice effectively 
suspend permit compliance deadlines for achieving zero 
discharge of coal ash transport water? 
 
Issue 2(a): Was the invocation of section 705 to suspend the 
compliance date proper and adequately justified? 
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EnerProg and EPA 
 
1. Why should section 705 apply to “compliance dates,” when 
the statute clearly states that it applies to “effective 
dates?” Why should this court consider an expanded view 
of this term? 
2. How was the section 705 suspension based on “pending 
litigation” when the litigation was stayed prior to the 
issuance of the Notice? 
3. Was the EPA required to apply the four-part preliminary 
injunction test to a postponement under section 705? If not, 
what is the justification for EPA to depart from the long-
standing practice of employing this test? 
4. What is the appropriate test to evaluate whether “justice 
so requires”? 
 
FCW 
 
1. If the purpose of section 705 is to maintain the status quo 
pending litigation, why should the term “compliance date” 
not be read broadly? 
2. What is the “status quo” to be maintained as applicable 
here? 
3. Was the section 705 suspension made based on “pending 
litigation”? 
4. Was EPA required to apply the four-part preliminary 
injunction test to a postponement under section 705? 
 
Issue 2(b): Was notice and comment rulemaking required? 
 
EnerProg and EPA 
 
1. Does section 705 replace the notice and comment 
rulemaking requirement? [Can a statute override a 
separate statutory duty simply by failing to reference it?] 
2. How does the suspension of a compliance date preserve the 
status quo? 
3. How is the suspension of an already effective rule not a 
substantive rulemaking? 
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4. Why should this court not follow the reasoning set forth in 
Becerra, which held that suspension of a deadline for the 
purposes of reevaluating the policy is not a matter of 
preserving the status quo? 
5. How is this suspension not an effective repeal of the rule? 
 
FCW 
 
1. Does section 705 replace the notice and comment 
rulemaking requirement? Does requiring notice and 
commenting rulemaking for a section 705 suspension 
undermine the suspension’s purpose? 
2. Why does the suspension of a compliance date differ from 
the suspension of an effective date, as related to whether 
it is a substantive rulemaking? 
3. Did the EPA properly invoke the good cause exception to 
the notice and comment rulemaking requirement? 
 
Issue 3: Can EPA Region XII rely on BPJ as an alternative 
ground to require zero discharge of coal ash transport 
wastes? 
 
EnerProg 
 
1. When is it appropriate to rely on BPJ? 
2. Is the reliance on BPJ permissible where ELGS exist for 
an industry category, but not for a specific pollutant within 
that category? (Does “no applicable ELGS” refer to only 
ELGs for a particular industry, or more specifically to 
pollutants within ELGs for an industry?) 
3. Did the EPA “consider” these pollutants when establishing 
the 1982 ELGs? 
4. Given the changes in available technology since 1982, why 
should EPA not be permitted to use BPJ to establish 
standards? 
 
FCW and EPA 
 
1. When is it appropriate to rely on BPJ? 
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2. Why should the EPA’s conclusions [in the 1982 ELGs] that 
these pollutants should not be regulated because then-
existing technologies cannot effectively reduce them not 
constitute as “consideration”? 
3. Is EPA permitted to establish BPJ standards when ELGs 
were currently in place for those pollutants at the time the 
permit was issued, yet expected to be subject to 
litigation/reconsideration? 
4. What factors does a permit writer need to consider when 
relying on BPJ, and did the permit writer, in this case, 
consider all appropriate factors? 
 
Issue 4: Is a NPDES permit required for the pollutant 
discharges into the ash pond? 
 
EnerProg and EPA 
 
1. Does the ash pond constitute a “water of the United 
States”? 
2. Was rulemaking required for the suspension of the 
exception that would bring the ash pond back within the 
definition of “waters of the United States”? 
 
FCW 
 
1. Why was the exception not merely explanatory, therefore 
rendering its suspension non-substantive (and not subject 
to notice and comment rulemaking)? 
2. Why should this court depart from EPA’s longstanding 
policy judgment of considering such ash ponds as outside 
of the definition of “waters of the United States”? 
3. Did EPA meet the requirements of the “good cause” 
exception to rulemaking? 
4. Is the challenge of this suspension timely? 
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Issue 5: Does the ash pond closure and capping require a 
permit for the discharge of fill material pursuant to section 
404? 
 
EnerProg and EPA 
 
1. What is the appropriate “waters of the United States” 
definition for this issue? 
2. Can the status of a wastewater treatment system change 
when its use is terminated? 
3. Why should this court not read into the “waters of the 
United States” definition a recapture provision, as a matter 
of public policy? 
 
FCW 
 
1. Why should this court not look to the Army Corps 
definition of “waters of the United States”? 
2. Why should the court rely on the EPA’s definition of 
“waters of the United States,” when the Army Corps has 
its own definition? 
3. Is this court permitted to read a recapture provision into 
this definition? 
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